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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product 
diversification in the changing structure of the European banking industry. Based on a broad 
set of European banks for the period 1996-2002, our study first shows that banks expanding 
into non-interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks 
which mainly supply loans. However, considering size effects and splitting non-interest 
activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the 
positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by 
commission and fee activities. A higher share of trading activities is never associated with 
higher risk and for small banks it implies, in some cases, lower asset and default risks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the context of financial deregulation that took place in the seventies and in the 
eighties, western banking systems faced major changes in the form of increased competition, 
concentration and restructuring. Banks have reacted to the new environment by adopting a 
proactive strategy widening the range of products they offer to their clients. These changes 
mainly implied an increasing share of non-interest income in profits. Non-interest income 
stems from traditional service charges (checking, cash management, letters of credit…) but 
also from new sources. With the decline in interest margins induced by higher competition 
banks were incited to charge higher fees on existing or new services (cash withdrawal, bank 
account management, data processing…). As a result, the structure of bank income 
experienced a dramatic change in both the U.S. and Europe. In the eighties, non-interest 
income represented 19 percent of U.S. commercial banks’ total income. This share had grown 
to 43 percent of total income in 2001 (Stiroh, 2004). In Europe, non-interest income has 
increased from 26 percent to 41 percent between 1989 and 1998 (ECB, 2000).  
 With the adoption of the new universal banking principle, commercial banks can 
compete on a wider range of market segments (investment banking, market trading …). 
Numerous studies questioned the implications of this new environment on bank risk. The 
issue is of importance for the safety and soundness of the banking system and a major 
challenge for supervisory authorities.  
The existing literature, mostly based on U.S. banks, either focused on portfolio 
diversification effects (risk return profile) (Boyd et al., 1980; Kwan, 1998; De Young and 
Roland, 2001) or on incentives approaches (Rajan, 1991; John et al., 1994; Puri, 1996; Boyd 
et al., 1998). Few studies were able to show that the combination of lending and non-interest 
income activities allows for diversification benefits and therefore risk reduction. Conversely, 
some papers find a significant positive impact of diversification on earnings volatility (De 
Young and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). As noted by De Young 
and Roland (2001), three main reasons may explain this increase in risk. Firstly, income from 
lending activities is likely to be relatively stable over time because switching and information 
costs make it costly for either borrowers or lenders to walk away from a lending relationship. 
In contrast, income from non-interest income activities may suffer from larger fluctuations as 
it might be easier to switch banks for this type of activities than for lending. Secondly, 
expanding non-interest income activities may imply a rise in fixed costs (for example, 
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additional staff may be required), which increases the operational leverage of banks. 
Conversely, once a lending relationship is established, the marginal cost induced by the 
supply of additional loans is limited to interest expenses. Thirdly, because bank regulators do 
not require banks to hold capital against non-interest income activities, earnings volatility 
may increase because of a higher degree of financial leverage. Moreover, as mentioned by 
Stiroh (2004), cross-selling of different products to a core customer does not imply 
diversification benefits (more products are sold to the same customer) which may explain 
why interest income growth and non-interest income growth are highly correlated in his 
study.   
 The aim of this paper is to assess the risk implications of the changing structure of the 
European banking industry which has shifted away from traditional intermediation activities 
(deposit funded loans) towards activities generating non-interest income. Using individual 
bank data from 1996 to 2002 for 734 European banks, we start by analysing the link between 
bank risk and the degree of output diversification measured by three indicators: the income 
share i/ of non-interest income, ii/ of trading income and iii/ of commissions and fees income. 
We hence start by comparing the risk level of banks which have expanded into non traditional 
activities with banks which have not pursued such a strategy. While previous work on bank 
diversification was essentially dedicated to the U.S. banking industry and mostly on  the 
overall link between risk and portfolio diversification (diversification benefits) we specifically 
focus on the risk implications of engaging in new commercial activities for European banks. 
Our results show that higher reliance on non-interest generating activities is associated with 
higher risk but that higher risk is more strongly correlated with commission and fee income 
than trading activities. Our findings are more robust for small banks with total assets smaller 
than 1 billion € which significantly increase their risk exposure when engaging in commission 
and fee activities. Conversely, for small listed banks a larger share in trading income is 
associated with a lower risk exposure and lower default risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
bank risk and product diversification and shows how our study extends the existing work. 
Section 3 presents our product diversification and risk indicators as well as preliminary 
univariate tests and section 4 shows the results of our regression analysis. Section 5 
concludes.  
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2. Existing literature and research focus 
Over the two past decades, the combination of traditional and non traditional activities 
in banking has given rise to a substantial number of studies. Most of the existing literature is 
dedicated to potential diversification benefits for banks to engage in a broader scope of 
activities. In general, these studies, which essentially considered U.S. data, provide mixed 
results. For instance, Boyd et al. (1980), who simulated portfolios of banking and non-bank 
subsidiaries during the 1970s, find a potential for risk reduction at relatively low levels of 
non-bank activities. The results obtained by Kwast (1989) to determine an optimal risk-
minimising combination of banking and non-banking activities for the period 1976-1985 
show only a slight potential for risk reduction. Gallo et al. (1996) find, over the 1987-1994 
period, that combining bank and mutual fund activities allows for some diversification 
benefits increasing profitability for moderated risk levels
1
.  
Another strand of the literature reports no diversification benefits or even an increase 
in risk when combining traditional and non interest income activities. According to Boyd and 
Graham (1986), expansion by BHCs into non-bank activities during the seventies tended to 
increase the risk of failure of banks during the less stringent policy period. Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997) who study the stock returns of BHCs between 1980 and 1993 find that 
although banks extended their product mixes, no risk reduction could be observed as banks 
tended to move to riskier activities and to lower their capital ratio. Kwan (1998), who 
investigated bank section 20 subsidiaries during the 1990-1997 period, underlines the 
increased volatility of accounting returns despite a non increase in bank profitability. 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) look at the impact of fee-based activities on bank profitability 
and volatility for large U.S. commercial banks from 1988 to 1995. They conclude that fee-
based activities, which represent a growing share of banking activities, increase the volatility 
of bank revenue. A similar result is obtained by Stiroh (2004) who assesses the potential 
benefit of diversification for US banks engaging in non interest activities for the period 1984-
2001. He shows that net interest income and non interest income (which is relatively more 
volatile) are increasingly correlated (lower diversification benefits). Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) find similar results while considering US financial holding companies for the period 
1997-2002. 
                                                 
1
 Another group of studies simulate mergers between bank holding companies and nonbank financial firms 
(Boyd and Graham, 1988; Boyd et al., 1993; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Laderman, 1999; Lown et al. 2000; 
Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; for a survey, see Kwan and Laderman, 1999). Simulations were ran to assess the 
impact on risk of combining traditional banking activities and securities and/or insurance activities (US 
commercial banks were not allowed to provide such activities before 1999).  
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Several causes were explored to explain why diversification benefits were not 
effective in some studies. DeYoung and Roland (2001) suggest three explanations: high 
competition on non-interest income activities, fixed costs associated to fee-based activities 
and lack of regulation on non-interest income activities. According to Stiroh (2004) and 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006), as mentioned above, higher correlation between non-interest 
income and interest income can be due to possible cross-selling of different products to the 
same customer.   
This paper extends the earlier work on bank diversification in several directions. First, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the case of the European banking industry 
which experienced tremendous changes over the last decade
2
. Second, this study considers a 
large set of risk and insolvency measures based on accounting data but also on market data at 
the bank individual level. Third, to assess the risk implications of different types of product 
mixes, non interest generating activities are split into two components: trading activities and 
commission and fee activities. Fourth, we conduct a regression analysis which enables to 
capture the major changes in our period of study and we focus on risk implications both for 
large and small banks which is a major issue regarding diversification.   
 
3.  Definition of variables, data and preliminary statistics 
3.1. Product diversification variables: an income structure approach 
One way to capture the degree of diversification of bank activities in the literature (see 
Stiroh (2004)) is to consider the structure of income statements that is the shares of net 
interest income generated by traditional activities and non-interest income produced by non 
traditional activities. We therefore define several variables. First, we consider the ratio of net 
non interest income to net operating income NNII. Net non-interest income is defined as the 
difference between non-interest income and non-interest expenses; net operating income is the 
sum of net interest income and net non interest income. Second, our product diversification 
measure is also disaggregated, as in De Young and Roland (2001) and in Stiroh (2004), to 
allow for deeper insights. More precisely, we distinguish two components of non-interest 
income: commission and fee income and trading income. We hence define a ratio of net 
                                                 
2
 Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2002) have studied the case of Italian banks by looking at the degree of 
diversification of the loan portfolio. Their findings show that loan diversification is not guaranteed to produce a 
higher return and/or lower risk for banks. Another study (Smith, Staikouras and Wood, 2003) dedicated to 
European banks focused on the correlation between non-interest income and interest income and their variability 
showing that the increased importance of non-interest income stabilised profits in the banking industry during 
the period 1994-1998.   
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commission and fee income to net operating income (COM) and a ratio of net trading income 
to net operating income (TRAD).  Net commission income is equal to commission income 
minus commission expense and net trading income is equal to trading income minus trading 
expense.  
 
3.2. Accounting data based risk measures 
Three standard measures of risk, based on annual accounting data and determined for each 
bank throughout the period, are used in our study: (i) the standard deviation of the return on 
average assets (SDROA); (ii) the standard deviation of the return on average equity 
(SDROE); (iii) the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (LLP).  
We also compute insolvency risk measures: (i) the “Z-score” (ADZ)
3
 which indicates the 
probability of failure of a given bank; (ii) the “ZP-score” (ADZP) as in Goyeau and Tarazi 
(1992) and its two additive components
4
 which we call ADZP1 and ADZP2. ADZP1 is a 
measure of bank portfolio risk whereas ADZP2 is a measure of leverage risk. 
 
3.3. Market data based risk measures 
To check for robustness, we compute risk and insolvency measures using market data for 
a sample of listed banks. Three additional risk measures are used which are the standard 
deviation of weekly stock returns (SDRET)
5
, the market model beta coefficient estimated 
through a single factor model (BETA)
6
 and specific risk (RSPEC)
7
 which is the standard 
deviation of the market model residuals. Insolvency risk (bank default risk) is captured using 
a market data based Z-score
8
 (MDZ) and the distance to default
9
 (DD).  
                                                 
3
 )ADZ (1 average ROE / SDROE= + where ROE and SDROE are expressed in percentage. Higher values of Z-
scores imply lower probabilities of failure (see Boyd and Graham (1986) for details). 
4
 ADZP=ADZP1 + ADZP2 = 
average ROA average (Total equities / Total assets)
SDROA SDROA
+ . 
5
 We use daily stock prices to calculate weekly stock returns. The standard deviation of weekly stock returns at 
date t is computed over the period [t-100, t]. 
6
 To calculate the value of the beta at date t, we estimate the single index market model over the period [t-100, t] 
using for each country its domestic market return as defined by Datastream International. 
7
 We compute for each trading day the single index market model over the period [t-100, t]. We use the standard 
deviation of residuals to estimate specific risk at date t. 
8
 MDZ-score = 
R 1+σ , where R  and σ  are respectively the mean and the standard deviation of the weekly 
returns Rt for a given year. 
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3.4. Data 
We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1996 to 
2002 for a set of European commercial and cooperative banks established in 14 European 
countries
10
: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (see Appendix, Table A.1). 
The bank data used for the estimates come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA which is currently the 
most comprehensive data set for European banks. This database reports information on a 
number of banks which is almost equivalent to what is officially declared by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and is often used by the ECB itself for cross country studies. Apart from 
the very large number of small German local cooperative banks (more than 1600 banks) that 
we deliberately ignored, Bankscope reported, at the end of 2002, balance sheets and income 
statements for 2129 banks for the countries we consider in this study. Considering these 2129 
banks we then restricted our sample to 734 banks. First, we deleted 1291 banks with less than 
three subsequent years of time series observations
11
. Second, in order to minimize the effects 
of measurement errors we have excluded all the outliers (194 banks) by eliminating the 
extreme bank/year observations (2.5% lowest values and 2.5% highest values) for each 
considered variable. We further checked that the statistical properties of our clean sample of 
734 banks and the initial sample of 2129 banks were similar by conducting mean tests for all 
our variables and by performing distribution tests.  
Based on the clean sample of 734 banks we also consider a sub-sample of listed banks. 
Market data (bank stock prices) come from Datastream International. Banks with 
discontinuously traded stocks being omitted, 156 banks remain in this sub-sample.  
                                                                                                                                                        
9
 The distance to default is inferred from the market value of a risky debt (Merton, 1977) based on the Black and 
Scholes (1973) option pricing formula. Daily market value of the bank’s equity come from Datastream. The 
annual (261 trading days) volatility of the bank’s equity is estimated as the standard deviation of the annual 
moving average of daily equity returns multiplied by 261 . The maturity of the debt is set to one, i.e. one year. 
We use the 12 months interbank rates from Datastream for the risk-free rate, except for Greece, for which we use 
the six-month interbank rate. We obtain data on debt liabilities from Bankscope Ficth IBCA. We calculate the 
total amount of liabilities as the total amount of deposits, money-market funding, bonds, subordinated debt and 
hybrid capital.  
10
 In Europe, higher competition on traditional intermediation activities has been driving banks to enter into 
“new” non interest activities.  Of course the situation can differ from one country to the other but there has been 
no recent change in the legal environment regarding universal banking as in the US. The main changes refer to 
safety and competition (prudential regulation). One could consider the Second EU Banking Directive of 1989 
(which has allowed European banks to pursue functional diversification) as a change in the legal environment.  
However, in some countries banks were already allowed to combine different activities decades ago (Spain, 1974; 
United Kingdom, 1987...). Historically, German banks were “born” universal and in France banks have, to some 
extent, always pursued different activities.  
11
 All the banks in our sample publish their annual financial statements at the end of the calendar year. 
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Descriptive statistics of our two samples are presented in Table 1. Both samples show 
sufficient heterogeneity in different types of banking activities, enabling us to analyse the 
behaviour of banks depending on their degree of product diversification. To ensure that our 
sample of 734 banks contains a sufficient number of large and small banks with similar 
profiles, Table A.2 in Appendix provides descriptive statistics for banks with total assets 
greater than 1 billion € on  average over the period 1996-2002 (366 banks) and banks with 
total assets smaller than 1 billion € (368 banks). Our criterion for distinguishing large and 
small banks is similar to Bankscope’s and is frequently used in the literature to categorize 
banks (see Carter and McNulty (2005)). Consistent with the statistics released by the 
European Central Bank for 2005 (see ECB (2005)), smaller banks in our sample exhibit a 
lower ROE because they hold a relatively larger amount of equity but their ROA is higher on 
average. Apart from this difference, the balance sheet profiles and the income shares of non-
interest activities are similar on average for large and small banks. The sub-sample of listed 
banks includes 104 banks with total assets greater than 1 billion € and 52 banks with total 
assets smaller than 1 billion €. 
   
3.5. Univariate mean tests 
The literature cited above highlights, with regards to U.S. banks, that activity 
diversification does not necessarily imply lower risk, and may on the contrary increase bank 
risk. As a first step we check if similar results can also be obtained for European banks by 
simply conducting mean tests. We therefore split our samples into different panels of banks 
on the basis of the value of the ratio of net non interest income to net operating income (NNII) 
We consider as diversified, banks for which the value of the NNII ratio is higher than the third 
quartile (Q75) and as non diversified, banks with a NNII ratio lower than the first quartile 
(Q25). Considering our data, we also compare the level of risk of banks which are 
characterized by high levels of fee-based activities that is banks with a ratio of net 
commission income to net operating income (COM) higher than the third quartile Q75, with 
banks with the same ratio not exceeding the value of the first quartile (COM lower than Q25). 
Eventually, we undertake the same comparison on the basis of the degree of reliance on 
trading activities (ratio of net trading income to net operating income (TRAD) higher than Q75 
versus TRAD lower than Q25). 
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3.5.1. Bank risk and income structure 
The results in Table 2 show that banks which exhibit high degrees of diversification 
display higher risk and insolvency measures
12
. Therefore, on the whole, our results obtained 
for European banks are in line with those underlined for U.S. banks by DeYoung and Roland 
(2001) and Stiroh (2004). When we focus on the different sources of non traditional income 
our results also show that greater reliance on fee-based activities is associated with higher risk 
and higher default (insolvency) risk whereas higher dependence on trading activities does not 
necessarily imply higher risk levels. The results based on higher frequency market data 
indicators in Table 3 confirm those obtained with accounting data
13
.  
 
3.5.2 Income structure and bank characteristics 
In order to further investigate the characteristics of banks in the high non-interest income 
category and in the low non-interest income category, Table 4 provides mean test results 
performed on the basis of our different diversification variables. As a whole, banks with a 
larger income share of non-interest activities are less reliant on traditional intermediation 
activities (deposit and loans) but are also less leveraged (higher equity ratio). They are also 
more profitable on average (higher ROE and ROA) and exhibit a higher ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets. Banks with a higher income share of trading activities are larger on 
average, but larger banks do not exhibit a higher or a lower portion of commission and fee 
income in total income.  
 
4. Multivariate Regression analysis 
 
 To further investigate this issue on risk and diversification, we conduct in this section 
cross section OLS estimations on different samples of banks. More precisely, our accounting 
as well as market based risk measures are regressed on our product diversification variables 
and a set of control variables as well as country dummies to capture the presence of country 
specific effects.  
 
                                                 
12
 Similar results, reinforced with higher significance levels, are obtained when the median or the mean is used to 
discriminate our two sets of banks. 
13
 Banks were also ranked on the one hand depending on their average level of diversification and on the other 
hand given their average risk level over the period 1996-2002. A Spearman test was conducted to compare their 
respective ranks in each set.  The null hypothesis of independency of each group of banks was rejected . In other 
words, banks with a higher level of risk are also those exhibiting a higher level of diversification (see Tables A.3 
and A.4 in appendix).  
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The  estimated models are : 
 
iM _ RISK = α + β M _ DIV i + H h hi
h 1
M _ X= γ∑  +  DUM_COUNTRYji +  εi           (1) 
 
where 
iM _ RISK  is the mean value, for bank i, taken for the period 1996-2002, of each 
market based risk measure (SDRET, RSPEC, BETA, MDZ and DD) and LLP or the value 
itself of accounting based indicators computed over the sample period (SDROA, SDROE, 
CVROA, CVROE, ADZ, ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2).  
M_DIVi is the mean value, for bank i, for the period 1996-2002, of each product 
diversification variable  (NNII, COM and TRAD). 
M_ X hi is the mean value, for bank i, for the period 1996-2002, for a set of control variables 
Xh.  
DUM_COUNTRYji is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if bank i belongs to 
country j and zero otherwise.  
 A large set of control variables was initially considered to account for size differences 
(natural logarithm of total assets Log(TA)), profitability differences (ROA and ROE), 
business differences (deposits to total assets (DEP)), loans to total assets (LOANS), personnel 
expenses to total assets (EXPENSES) and leverage differences (EQUITY). Because of 
frequent collinearity among the variables both in the large sample and the smaller sample of 
listed banks, control variables are restricted to Log(TA), ROE and the leverage ratio 
orthogonalized with total assets (OEQUITY)
14
. We also include the annual growth rate of 
total assets (∆TA). An increase in a bank’s total assets is presumed to capture the effect on 
risk of growth strategies and acquisitions experienced by many European banks in the end of 
the 1990’s and the early 2000’s.  To check for robustness the estimations were also run with 
alternative sets of control variables. Our results are not altered when the independant variables 
are all introduced without considering collinearity issues.  
 Tables 5 and 6 show the results obtained for the whole sample of 734 banks and tables 
7 and 8 the results for the sample of 156 listed banks using high frequency market data for 
risk measures instead of accounting data. For each sample, estimations were also separately 
                                                 
14
  Log(TA) is strongly and negatively correlated with EQUITY and ROA. Because the leverage ratio is an 
important determinant of risk, we orthogonalized EQUITY with total assets. Log(TA), LOANS and DEP are 
positively correlated. For small banks, ROA is negatively correlated with LOANS and DEP but positively 
correlated for large banks. Our diversification variables NNII, COM and TRAD are strongly and negatively 
correlated with LOANS but positively correlated with ROA for the small banks included in the large sample of 
734 banks.  
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run for large banks (total assets greater than 1 billion €) and for small banks (total assets 
smaller than 1 billion €)
15
. In all our accounting data based estimations (Tables 5 and 6) 
higher reliance on non-interest activities (measured either by NNII, COM or TRAD) and 
higher asset growth is associated with an increase in bank default risk (right hand side of the 
tables). The use of market based indicators confirms the positive impact of asset growth on 
the probability of failure of banks but the effect of higher reliance on non-interest activities is 
less clear. An increase in default risk is only induced by a larger share of commission and fee 
activities at small banks and smaller banks benefit from lower default risk when they further 
engage in trading activities.   
 When the dependant variable is a risk indicator (left hand side of the tables) the 
coefficients associated to the asset growth variable M_∆TA is significant and positive in most 
of the estimations with higher coefficients and significance levels for market based indicators 
and specifically for large banks. This result suggests that growth strategies are considered as 
riskier by market participants and specially for large banks. In our broad samples (large and 
small banks) an increase in the share of non-interest income is associated with a higher risk 
but this result is driven by commission and fee income both for listed banks (Table 8) and in 
the broad sample of banks (Table 6). However, the impact of non-interest activities is 
different for large and small banks as shown by the estimation results obtained with the sub-
samples (samples 1’, 1”, 2’, 2” in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8). Small banks are exposed to higher 
risk when the income share of commissions and fee activities increases. But small banks 
might also benefit from lower risk (portfolio diversification effect) for higher shares of 
trading activities as shown by the results obtained with market based risk indicators (Table 8). 
Conversely, for large banks, an increase in the share of non-interest activities, either trading 
or commission and fee activities, does not significantly affect risk although the coefficients of 
the aggregate variable M_NNII are significant and positive for large listed banks (Table 8). 
To check for robustness and to explore the effect on risk of a relatively larger expansion into 
non traditional fee based activities and trading activities we ran our estimations by including 
dummies for the diversification quartiles Q75 and Q25 instead of the values of COM and 
TRAD. Tables 9 and 10 show the results respectively for the broad sample and for the sample 
                                                 
15
 Country dummy variables were not included in the estimations for these two sub-samples because of an 
insufficient degree of freedom.  
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of listed banks
16
. Overall, the main findings regarding the effect of product diversification on 
bank risk remain the same. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The objective of this study was to analyze the risk implications of the trend towards 
stronger product diversification in the European banking industry. Our study shows that banks 
which have expanded into non-interest income activities present a higher level of risk than 
banks which mainly perform traditional intermediation activities. A closer investigation 
shows that this positive relationship between risk and product diversification as measured by 
bank income structure is more robust for small banks and that, in all cases, risk is mainly 
positively correlated with the share of fee-based activities but not with trading activities. To 
some extent, engaging in trading activities might imply a decrease in risk for smaller banks. 
Therefore the presumption that the diversification benefits of engaging into trading activities 
might be larger than those induced by supplying services to core customers is not rejected. 
                                                 
16
 Results obtained with the diversification quartiles Q75 and Q25 of NNII are not presented in the paper but are 
available on request. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for European commercial and cooperative banks, on average over the period 1996-2002 (%) 
  LOANS  DEP  EQUITY LLP EXPENSES ROA ROE NII NNII 
 
COM 
 
TRAD 
 
TA 
Sample 1 : Non listed and listed banks (734 banks) 
Mean 
53.64 52.66 10.66 0.94 1.89 1.01 7.98 64.25 34.36 23.16 9.69 11 361 376 
Std 
19.83 20.01 8.76 1.16 1.86 3.45 14.12 23.80 23.98 20.28 12.28 44 765 822 
Max 
96.47 90.02 59.70 9.99 24.72 30.01 77.25 100 100 89.66 97.67 7.45 E+08 
Min 
6.91 0.61 0.49 -1.67 0 -8.33 -79.49 -105.12 -108.58 -98.29 -52.07 6 084 
Sample 2 : Listed banks (156 banks) 
Mean  64.36  59.15  8.95  0.79  2.06  1.10  11.04  66.51  33.25 26.41 5.54 44 454 004  
Std  13.83  16.88  5.77  0.66  3.58  1.66  7.19  15.66  16.33 20.57 8.06 123 687 663 
Max  92.12  90.96  55.00  8.00  46.59  23.53  75.77  97.09  97.22 100 55.55 7.45 E+08 
Min 7.81  12.92  2.23 -0.54  0.26 -17.54 -34.89  2.78 -89.55 -5.67 -12.16 25 608 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage): LOANS = loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = 
equity/total assets; LLP = loan loss provisions/net loans; EXPENSES = personnel expenses/total assets; ROA = return on average assets; ROE 
= return on average equity; NII = net interest income/net operating income; COM = net commission income/net operating income; TRAD = net 
trading  income/net operating income; NNII = net non interest income/ net operating income; TA = total assets (thousand euros). 
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Table 2. Income structure and accounting indicators of risk for European banks (1996-2002)  
 Risk measures Insolvency risk measures 
 SDROA SDROE LLP ADZ ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 
NNII > Q75        
Mean   
(184 Obs.) 
1.130 
 
8.695 
 
1.239 
 
29.532 
 
28.804 
 
2.384 
 
26.420 
 
NNII < Q25        
Mean   
(184 Obs.) 
0.451 
 
5.156 
 
0.752 
 
51.090 
 
47.678 
 
3.299 
 
44.378 
 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test 
4.840*** 
 
2.612** 
 
2.838*** 
 
-4.642*** 
 
-4.250*** 
 
-2.536** 
 
-4.325*** 
 
        
COM > Q75        
Mean  
(184 Obs.) 
1,237 
 
8,601 
 
1,120 
 
32,695 
 
31,529 
 
2,632 
 
28,898 
 
COM < Q25        
Mean 
(184 Obs.) 
0,605 
 
6,479 
 
0,788 
 
48,078 
 
42,856 
 
2,945 
 
39,911 
 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test 
2,336** 
 
2,380** 
 
2,013** 
 
-3,332*** 
 
-2,636** 
 
-3,929*** 
 
-2,730*** 
 
        
TRAD > Q75        
Mean 
(184 Obs.) 
1,003 
 
7,888 
 
1,134 
 
30,435 
 
29,170 
 
2,310 
 
26,860 
 
TRAD < Q25        
Mean 
(184 Obs.) 
0,494 
 
7,727 
 
0,750 
 
50,289 
 
44,572 
 
3,703 
 
40,869 
 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test 
3,068*** 
 
0,081 
 
2,491** 
 
-4,708*** 
 
-3,973*** 
 
-3,865*** 
 
-3,890*** 
 
T statistics test for the null:"Risk/Insolvency is not different for high level of product diversification". 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a bilateral test.  
Variable definitions: NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; COM = ratio of net commission income to net operating income;  
TRAD = ratio of net trading income to net operating income; SDROA = standard deviation of the return on average assets;  SDROE = standard 
deviation  
of the return on average equity; LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; ADZ = Z-score;  ADZP = “ZP-score”; ADZP1 = measure of bank  
portfolio risk; ADZP2 = measure of leverage risk. 
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Table 3. Income structure and market indicators of risk for European listed banks (1996-2002)  
 Risk Measures Insolvency risk measures 
 SDRET BETA RSPEC MDZ DD 
NNII > Q75      
Mean   
(Obs.) 
0.05 
39 
0.66 
39 
0.04 
39 
37.30 
39 
15.51 
38 
NNII < Q25      
Mean   
(Obs.) 
0.02 
39 
0.18 
39 
0.02 
39 
51.31 
39 
26.13 
38 
T-statistic of 
the mean Test 4.800*** 4.970*** 3.900*** -2.060** -1.870** 
      
COM > Q75     
 
Mean  
(Obs.) 
0.05 
39 
0.57 
39 
0.04 
39 
36.15 
39 
15.37 
38 
COM < Q25      
Mean 
(Obs.) 
0.03 
39 
0.21 
39 
0.03 
39 
55.92 
39 
28.95 
38 
T-statistic of 
the mean Test 3.270*** 3.560*** 2.540*** -2.820*** -2.350** 
      
TRAD > Q75      
Mean 
(Obs.) 
0.04 
34 
0.68 
34 
0.03 
34 
38.80 
34 
16.09 
33 
TRAD < Q25      
Mean 
(Obs.) 
0.03 
34 
0.32 
34 
0.03 
34 
43.55 
34 
21.29 
33 
T-statistic of 
the mean Test 0.970 3.070*** 0 -0.850 -0.890 
T statistics test for the null: "Risk/Insolvency is not different for highand low degree of product 
diversification". ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a 
bilateral test. 
Variable definitions: NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; COM = ratio of 
net commission income to net operating income; TRAD = ratio of net trading income to net operating 
income; SDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns; BETA = market model beta; RSPEC = 
standard deviation of the market model residual;  MDZ  = market data based Z-score; DD = distance 
to default.  
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Table 4. Income structure and bank characteristics for European banks (1996-2002) 
 LOANS DEP EQUITY EXPENSES TA ROA ROE NII NNII COM TRAD 
NNII > Q75            
Mean   
(Obs.) 
 41.77 
184 
 45.41 
184 
 13.96 
184 
 0.71 
184 
 23821539 
184 
 1.54 
184 
 11.49 
184 
 29.43 
184 
 70.56 
184 
 53.09 
184 
14.27 
184 
NNII < Q25            
Mean   
(Obs.) 
 66.41 
184 
 56.51 
184 
 10.64 
184 
 0.64 
184 
 3148591 
184 
 0.79 
184 
 7.33 
184 
 85.56 
184 
 14.43 
184 
 12.11 
184 
 1.73 
184 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test -15,07*** -6,42*** 4,07*** 6,93*** 3,52*** 4,18*** 3,17*** -64,08*** 61,12*** 31,99*** 14,12*** 
            
COM > Q75            
Mean  
(Obs.) 
 47.16 
184 
 48.83 
184 
 13.16 
184 
2.90 
184 
 8791319 
184 
 1.47 
184 
 11.58 
184 
 35.90 
184 
 64.09 
184 
 54.89 
184 
 8.39 
184 
COM < Q25            
Mean 
(Obs.) 
 63.50 
184 
 53.87 
184 
 10.32 
184 
 1.10 
184 
 5547763 
184 
 0.81 
184 
 8.00 
184 
 82.28 
184 
 17.71 
184 
 8.55 
184 
 6.36 
184 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test -8,66*** -2,89*** 3,56*** 7,51*** 1,08 3,80*** 2,75*** -34,02*** 31,07*** 48,47*** 2,22** 
            
TRAD > Q75            
Mean 
(Obs.) 
 45.58 
184 
 47.16 
184 
 12.16 
184 
 2.05 
184 
 29610494 
184 
 1.26 
184 
 10.65 
184 
 46.28 
184 
 53.71 
184 
 33.46 
184 
 18.41 
184 
TRAD < Q25            
Mean 
(Obs.) 
 65.63 
184 
 56.58 
184 
 9.76 
184 
 1.58 
184 
 5711714 
184 
 0.73 
184 
 8.04 
184 
 74.04 
184 
 25.95 
184 
 25.80 
184 
-1.70 
184 
T-statistic of the 
mean Test -11,37*** -4,89*** 2,81*** 2,19** 11,93*** 2,90*** 1,85* -13,88*** 12,15*** 3,93*** 23,31*** 
T statistics test for the null: "bank characteristics  are  not different for high and low degree  of product diversification". 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a bilateral test.  
Variable definitions: NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; COM = ratio of net commission income to net operating income; TRAD = ratio of net 
trading income to net operating income; LOANS = loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = equity/total assets;  EXPENSES = personnel expenses/total 
assets; TA=total assets (thousand of euros); ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on average equity; NII = net interest income/net operating income; TA = total 
assets (thousand euros). 
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Table 5.  OLS estimations for the sample of 734 banks with M_NNII as the independent 
variable (cross section estimations) 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP ADZ ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 
Sample 1 : all banks (734) 
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.0058** 
(2.235) 
0.0859*** 
(2.784) 
0.0111*** 
(4.157) 
-0.4389*** 
(-5.919) 
-0.4231*** 
(-6.406) 
-0.0222*** 
(-4.202) 
-0.4008*** 
(-6.494) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.1154** 
(-2.116) 
-0.5671** 
(-2.091) 
-0.0861*** 
(-3.627) 
1.3781* 
(1.664) 
1.1725 
(1.585) 
0.1491** 
(2.373) 
1.0233 
(1.482) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0204 
(1.269) 
-0.2147 
(-0.786) 
-0.0118* 
(-1.709) 
0.1474 
(1.100) 
0.0731 
(0.635) 
0.0762*** 
(4.438) 
-0.0031 
(-0.029) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0007*** 
(2.760) 
0.0004 
(0.268) 
-0.0033*** 
(-3.594) 
-0.0206*** 
(-3.247) 
-0.0237*** 
(-5.281) 
-0.0013*** 
(-4.075) 
-0.0224*** 
(-5.269) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0554*** 
(4.748) 
-0.0692 
(-1.206) 
-0.0021 
(-0.313) 
0.0443 
(0.276) 
0.0943 
(0.526) 
-0.0207** 
(-2.505) 
0.1150 
(0.664) 
R
2
(%) 23.73 7.97 17.79 10.18 12.75 14.60 13.29 
Sample 1’ : 368 small banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.0085** 
(2.062) 
0.1154*** 
(3.539) 
0.013*** 
(2.974) 
-0.3964*** 
(-5.198) 
-0.3291*** 
(-4.470) 
-0.0141*** 
(-2.422) 
-0.3149*** 
(-4.571) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.1445 
(-1.104) 
-0.1868 
(-0.295) 
-0.2649** 
(-2.592) 
1.8863 
(0.997) 
1.0822 
(0.545) 
-0.0163 
(-0.126) 
1.0982 
(0.583) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0258 
(1.119) 
-0.1519 
(-0.612) 
-0.0152 
(-1.624) 
0.1193 
(0.809) 
0.0672 
(0.504) 
0.0634*** 
(3.531) 
0.0037 
(0.031) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0009*** 
(3.419) 
0.0032 
(1.350) 
-0.0045*** 
(-3.086) 
-0.0189*** 
(-2.824) 
-0.0234*** 
(-4.340) 
-0.0013*** 
(-2.654) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.460) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0258 
(1.119) 
-0.0742 
(-1.208) 
0.0064 
(0.626) 
0.0166 
(0.089) 
0.0953 
(0.479) 
-0.0142 
(-1.194) 
0.1096 
(0.579) 
R
2
(%) 20.90 7.30 8.78 8.55 6.01 8.56 6.53 
Sample 1’’ : 366 large banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.0008 
(0.347) 
0.0231 
(0.739) 
0.0094*** 
(2.776) 
-0.3558*** 
(-3.376) 
-0.3097*** 
(-3.901) 
-0.0256*** 
(-3.689) 
-0.2841*** 
(-3.845) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0091 
(-0.222) 
-0.3673 
(-0.507) 
-0.0868*** 
(-2.861) 
-1.7654 
(-1.239) 
-0.7034 
(-0.576) 
0.0974 
(0.968) 
-0.8008 
(-0.699) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0087 
(0.469) 
-0.3515 
(-0.594) 
-0.0104 
(-0.882) 
0.2104 
(0.834) 
0.0274 
(0.133) 
0.0922*** 
(2.967) 
-0.0647 
(-0.339) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0061 
(-1.100) 
-0.1074 
(-1.148) 
-0.0091** 
(-2.504) 
0.0549 
(0.395) 
0.0933 
(0.706) 
0.0139 
(1.232) 
0.0793 
(0.645) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0877** 
(2.051) 
-0.0423 
(-0.152) 
-0.0090 
(-0.723) 
0.9254 
(1.690)* 
1.0644* 
(1.841) 
0.0058 
(0.205) 
1.0585* 
(1.905) 
R
2
(%)
 
25.32 5.45 9.70 5.50 7.32 12.17 7.88 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable X for bank i 
over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA = annual growth rate of total assets ; OEQUITY = EQUITY orthogonalized with TA; ;NNII = ratio of net 
non interest income to net operating income; SDROA = standard deviation of the return on average assets;  
SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity; LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; 
ADZ = Z-score;  ADZP = “ZP-score”; ADZP1 = measure of bank portfolio risk; ADZP2 = measure of leverage 
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Table 6.  OLS estimations for the sample of 734 banks with M_COM and M_TRAD as the 
independent variables (cross section estimations) 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDROA SDROE LLP ADZ ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 
Sample 1 : all banks (734) 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
0.0050 
(1.555) 
0.1012** 
(2.423) 
0.0082** 
(2.527) 
-0.4214*** 
(-4.398) 
-0.3768*** 
(-4.716) 
-0.0172** 
(-2.383) 
-0.3596*** 
(-4.857) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
0.0009 
(0.230) 
-0.0130 
(-0.339) 
0.0090 
(1.303) 
-0.3003** 
(-2.307) 
-0.3666*** 
(-3.255) 
-0.223** 
(-2.285) 
-0.3443*** 
(-3.300) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.1105** 
(-2.073) 
-0.4701* 
(-1.730) 
-0.0778*** 
(-3.264) 
1.1618 
(1.413) 
1.0240 
(1.380) 
0.1441** 
(2.371) 
0.8798 
(1.266) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0208 
(1.286) 
-0.2208 
(-0.798) 
-0.0112 
(-1.569) 
0.1388 
(1.050) 
0.0524 
(0.458) 
0.0742*** 
(4.344) 
-0.0218 
(-0.210) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0007*** 
(2.982) 
0.0009 
(0.464) 
-0.0026*** 
(-2.770) 
-0.0225** 
(-2.573) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.103) 
-0.0014*** 
(-3.375) 
-0.0240*** 
(-4.115) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0561*** 
(4.704) 
-0.0572 
(-1.010) 
-0.0005 
(-0.078) 
0.0333 
(0.200) 
0.0936 
(0.509) 
-0.0206** 
(-2.441) 
0.1143 
(0.643) 
R2(%) 23.48 7.83 16.35 9.17 11.59 13.96 12.14 
Sample 1’ : 368 small banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
0.0073* 
(1.913) 
0.1199*** 
(3.023) 
0.0079* 
(1.741) 
-0.3382*** 
(-3.414) 
-0.2568*** 
(-3.056) 
-0.00944** 
(-1.968) 
-0.2474*** 
(-3.179) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
0.0050 
(0.400) 
0.0408 
(0.703) 
0.0347* 
(1.672) 
-0.5101** 
(-2.399) 
-0.4641** 
(-2.152) 
-0.0234 
(-1.170) 
-0.4406 
(-2.228) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.1555 
(-1.198) 
-0.2866 
(-0.448) 
-0.2602** 
(-2.511) 
2.2667 
(1.194) 
1.4479 
(0.727) 
0.0025 
(0.019) 
1.4454 
(0.764) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0269 
(1.172) 
-0.1493 
(-0.597) 
-0.0131 
(-1.405) 
0.0853 
(0.581) 
0.02633 
(0.197) 
0.0608*** 
(3.440) 
-0.0345 
(-0.278) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0009*** 
(3.222) 
0.0035 
(1.163) 
-0.0039** 
(-2.582) 
-0.020** 
(-2.376) 
-0.0242*** 
(-3.656) 
-0.0013** 
(-2.413) 
-0.0228*** 
(-3.748) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0624*** 
(3.499) 
-0.0671 
(-1.078) 
0.0038 
(0.327) 
0.0303 
(0.158) 
0.1040 
(0.518) 
-0.0138 
(-1.140) 
0.1179 
(0.618) 
R2(%) 20.53 6.63 9.38 7.65 5.14 8.21 5.63 
Sample 1’’ : 366 large banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0039 
(-0.896) 
0.0074 
(0.153) 
0.0088* 
(1.933) 
-0.3403** 
(-2.260) 
-0.2050* 
(-1.910) 
-0.0185** 
(-2.247) 
-0.1866* 
(-1.849) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
0.0029 
(1.117) 
-0.0160 
(-0.307) 
0.0028 
(0.587) 
-0.1427 
(-0.980) 
-0.2647** 
(-2.232) 
-0.0218** 
(-2.026) 
-0.2429** 
(-2.189) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0145 
(-0.341) 
-0.2994 
(-0.401) 
-0.0689** 
(-2.338) 
-2.3159 
(-1.511) 
-0.9076 
(-0.709) 
0.0782 
(0.743) 
-0.9858 
(-0.821) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0095 
(0.508) 
-0.3519 
(-0.591) 
-0.0108 
(-0.904) 
0.2092 
(0.839) 
0.0023 
(0.011) 
0.0906*** 
(2.940) 
-0.0882 
(-0.458) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0066 
(-1.166) 
-0.1038 
(-1.081) 
-0.0080** 
(-2.339) 
0.0169 
(0.114) 
0.0807 
(0.583) 
0.0127 
(1.085) 
0.0680 
(0.527) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0879** 
(2.068) 
-0.0431 
(-0.155) 
-0.0070 
(-0.577) 
0.925 
(1.639) 
1.0576* 
(1.811) 
0.0048 
(0.169) 
1.0527* 
(1.877) 
R2(%) 25.66 5.40 7.57 4.40 5.99 11.22 6.59 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable X for bank i 
over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA = annual growth rate of total assets; OEQUITY = EQUITY orthogonalized with TA;  NNII = ratio of net 
non interest income to net operating income; SDROA = standard deviation of the return on average assets;  
SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity; CVROA  LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to net 
loans; ADZ = Z-score;  ADZP = “ZP-score”; ADZP1 = measure of bank portfolio risk; ADZP2 = measure of 
leverage risk. 
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Table 7.  OLS estimations for the sample of 156 listed banks with M_NNII as the 
independent variable (cross section estimations) 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDRET BETA RSPEC MDZ DD 
Sample 2 : 156 listed banks  
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(3.296) 
0.010*** 
(3.617) 
0.0006*** 
(2.793) 
-0.068 
(-0.258) 
-0.308** 
(-2.006) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0001* 
(1.751) 
0.0007*** 
(4.920) 
0.0001 
(0.144) 
-0.0006*** 
(-3.634) 
-0.0002*** 
(-4.420) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0008 
(-0.785) 
0.005 
(0.676) 
-0.001 
(-1.516) 
-0.869 
(-1.503) 
-0.467* 
(-1.867) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(5.292) 
0.011*** 
(5.318) 
0.0005*** 
(3.783) 
-0.854*** 
(-4.520) 
-0.383*** 
(-3.230) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0006* 
(-1.671) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.222) 
-0.0009 
(-0.791) 
0.563 
(0.888) 
1.646*** 
(3.818) 
R
2
(%) 34.24 45.43 27.19 20.56 26.84 
Sample 2’ : 52 small listed banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.001* 
(1.798) 
0.008* 
(1.735) 
0.001* 
(1.887) 
0.259 
(0.396) 
-0.597 
(-1.257) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0003 
(-1.133) 
-0.0001 
(-0.200) 
-0.0009 
(-1.139) 
0.019 
(0.909) 
0.019 
(0.703) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.001 
(-1.292) 
-0.700 
(-0.753) 
-0.001 
(-1.295) 
-0.165 
(-0.112) 
-1.420 
(-1.163) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001** 
(2.183) 
0.008** 
(2.287) 
0.001* 
(1 .887) 
-1.588** 
(-2.609) 
-1.061 
(-1.793) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
-0.001 
(-0.859) 
-0.006 
(-1.110) 
-0.0008 
(-0.741) 
-0.429 
(-0.392) 
1.960* 
(1.766) 
R
2
(%) 40.58 40.21 38.67 14.40 17.41 
Sample 2’’ : 104 large listed banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
M_NNII 
(t-statistics) 
0.0001** 
(2.612) 
0.007* 
(1.924) 
0.0001*** 
(3.379) 
-0.007 
(-0.041) 
-0.027 
(-0.529) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0005 
(1.378) 
0.0002*** 
(3.576) 
-0.0001 
(-0.121) 
-0.0006*** 
(-3.273) 
-0.0001*** 
(-5.112) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0008 
(0.169) 
0.0008 
(0.894) 
-0.0007 
(-0.878) 
-0.812* 
(-1.788) 
-0.225** 
(-2.104) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(4.861) 
0.012*** 
(4.227) 
0.0006*** 
(3.379) 
-0.732*** 
(-3.992) 
-0.185*** 
(-4.125) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.001 
(0.921) 
0.003 
(0.148) 
0.001 
(1.166) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.587** 
(2.092) 
R
2
(%)
 
32.38 37.89 24.16 20.40 22.33 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable 
X  for  bank i over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i over the period 
1996-2002; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA = annual growth rate of total assets; OEQUITY = 
EQUITY orthogonalized with TA; NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; 
SDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns; BETA = market model beta; RSPEC = standard 
deviation of the market model residual;  MDZ  = market data based Z-score; DD = distance to default. 
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Table 8.  OLS estimations for the sample of 156 listed banks with M_COM and 
M_TRAD as the independent variables (cross section estimations) 
 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDRET BETA RSPEC MDZ DD 
Sample 2 : 156 listed banks 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(4.111) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.322) 
0.0003*** 
(4.208) 
-0.424** 
(-2.277) 
-0.486 
(-1.318) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0001 
(-1.401) 
-0.006 
(-0.717) 
-0.0004 
(-1.358) 
0.253 
(0.469) 
0.539* 
(1.720) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0006*** 
(4.233) 
0.0003*** 
(5.769) 
0.0001** 
(2.635) 
-0.0002*** 
(-4.264) 
-0.0009*** 
(-5.761) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0008 
(-0.420) 
0.004 
(0.464) 
-0.0006 
(-0.742) 
-0.766 
(-1.583) 
-0.686** 
(-2.377) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(4.832) 
0.014*** 
(4.301) 
0.0007*** 
(4.208) 
-1.009*** 
(-4.423) 
-0.662*** 
(-3.335) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0007*** 
(-2.671) 
-0.016*** 
(-4.265) 
-0.0007** 
(-1.983) 
0.337 
(0.832) 
2.425*** 
(4.462) 
R
2
(%) 43.96 51.04 31.23 22.69 33.55 
Sample 2’ : 52 small listed banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
0.0006*** 
(2.947) 
0.011** 
(2.405) 
0.0001** 
(2.382) 
-0.112** 
(-2.465) 
-0.054 
(-0.730) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.403) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.984) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.366) 
4.256*** 
(4.069) 
2.980* 
(1.677) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0002 
(0.074) 
0.0004** 
(2.039) 
-0.0001 
(-0.021) 
0.015 
(0.750) 
0.022 
(0.776) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0006 
(-0.132) 
0.005 
(1.273) 
-0.0007 
(-0.104) 
-0.576 
(-0.391) 
-2.529 
(-1.557) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0004 
(1.281) 
0.002 
(0.799) 
0.0006 
(1.282) 
-1.136 
(-1.521) 
-2.252** 
(-2.284) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0007 
(1.194) 
0.002 
(0.952) 
0.0003 
(1.127) 
-0.242 
(-0.302) 
3.345 
(1.627) 
R
2
(%) 34.49 41.99 22.26 19.53 23.77 
Sample 2’’ : 104 large listed banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
M_COM 
(t-statistics) 
0.0001 
(1.033) 
-0.0008 
(-0.007) 
0.0006 
(1.067) 
-0.299 
(-0.691) 
-1.217 
(-1.163) 
M_TRAD 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0005 
(-0.628) 
-0.003 
(-0.316) 
-0.0004 
(-0.487) 
-0.340 
(-0.575) 
-0.079 
(-0.413) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0008** 
(2.635) 
0.0001*** 
(4.228) 
0.0005 
(0.851) 
-0.0008** 
(-2 .463) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.903) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0009 
(-0.463) 
0.005 
(0.450) 
-0.0001 
(0.883) 
-0.760 
(-1.404) 
-0.235* 
(-1.727) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0001*** 
(3.659) 
0.015*** 
(3.589) 
0.0004*** 
(2.890) 
-0.892*** 
(-3.372) 
-0.233*** 
(-3.083) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0006 
(0.017) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.353) 
0.0001 
(0.309) 
0.155 
(0.105) 
0.647* 
(1.660) 
R
2
(%)
 
41.79 43.77 41.23 36.86 33.48 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable 
X for  bank i over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i over the period 
1996-2002; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA = annual growth rate of total assets; OEQUITY = 
EQUITY orthogonalized with TA; NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; 
SDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns; BETA = market model beta; RSPEC = standard 
deviation of the market model residual;  MDZ  = market data based Z-score; DD = distance to default. 
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Table 9. OLS estimations for the sample of 734 banks with dummies variables on the 
structure of income as the independent variables (cross section estimations) 
 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDROA SDROE LLP ADZ ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 
Sample 1 : all banks (734) 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.247* 
(1.783) 
3.008** 
(2.038) 
0.061 
(0.467) 
-11.533*** 
(-3.597) 
-8.947*** 
(-2.939) 
-0.739*** 
(-3.055) 
-8.208*** 
(-2.874) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.062 
(0.548) 
-0.716 
(-0.583) 
-0.203* 
(-1.916) 
0.432 
(0.101) 
-1.437 
(-0.416) 
-0.465* 
(-1.769) 
-0.973 
(-0.300) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.136 
(0.748) 
1.830* 
(1.932) 
0.183 
(1.161) 
-15.182*** 
(-4.939) 
-13.236*** 
(-4.697) 
-0.820*** 
(-4.126) 
-12.415*** 
(-4.669) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.082 
(-0.660) 
2.660 
(1.512) 
-0.200** 
(-2.266) 
2.214 
(0.552) 
1.794 
(0.529) 
0.455 
(1.496) 
1.340 
(0.425) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.186*** 
(-4.739) 
0.097 
(0.408) 
-0.109*** 
(-3.987) 
-0.321 
(-0.517) 
-0.641 
(-1.039) 
-0.641 
(-1.039) 
-0.732 
(-1.262) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.021 
(1.345) 
-0.214 
(-0.799) 
-0.010 
(-1.363) 
0.090 
(0.676) 
-0.001 
(-0.008) 
0.075*** 
(4.580) 
-0.076 
(-0.703) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(3.952) 
0.001 
(0.205) 
-0.004** 
(-2.566) 
-0.020** 
(-2.522) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.298) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.033) 
-0.023 
(-0.703) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.059*** 
(4.487) 
-0.070 
(-1.119) 
-0.006 
(-0.729) 
0.246 
(1.456) 
0.315* 
(1.715) 
-0.004 
(-0.482) 
0.319* 
(1.791) 
R2(%)        
Sample 1’ : 368 small banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.236*** 
(2.842) 
3.461** 
(2.029) 
0.167 
(0.590) 
-10.096* 
(-1.946) 
-4.374*** 
(-3.868) 
-0.301*** 
(-3.730) 
-4.074*** 
(-2.869) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.126 
(-0.666) 
-1.304 
(-0.957) 
-0.216 
(-1.275) 
6.929 
(1.169) 
4.603 
(0.917) 
-0.200 
(-0.621) 
4.803 
(1.009) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.045 
(0.104) 
0.544 
(0.345) 
0.362 
(1.068) 
-8.963 
(-1.655) 
-9.840** 
(-2.064) 
-0.487 
(-1.442) 
-9.353** 
(-2.087) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.151 
(-0.676) 
0.268 
(0.151) 
-0.274* 
(-1.933) 
4.863 
(0.853) 
2.130 
(0.443) 
0.350 
(0.849) 
1.779 
(0.397) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.195 
(-1.044) 
0.621 
(0.627) 
-0.259** 
(-2.324) 
2.104 
(0.820) 
0.367 
(0.158) 
-0.069 
(-0.447) 
0.436 
(0.199) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.043* 
(1.815) 
-0.015 
(-0.057) 
-0.014 
(-1.382) 
-0.051 
(-0.307) 
-0.113 
(-0.740) 
0.056*** 
(3.025) 
-0.169 
(-1.172) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
-0.001 
(-0.266) 
-0.010 
(-0.275) 
-0.011 
(-1.430) 
-0.102 
(-0.829) 
-0.143 
(-1.301) 
-0.008 
(-1.077) 
-0.134 
(-1.292) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.061*** 
(3.606) 
0.0001 
(0.004) 
-0.017* 
(-1.796) 
0.051 
(0.304) 
0.066 
(0.412) 
-0.023*** 
(-2.993) 
0.089 
(0.578) 
R2(%)        
Sample 1’’ : 366 large banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.165 
(1.642) 
1.779 
(0.870) 
-0.008 
(-0.070) 
-11.042*** 
(-2.725) 
-11.118*** 
(-2.989) 
-1.061*** 
(-3.769) 
-10.057*** 
(-2.859) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.261 
(2.011) 
0.190 
(0.097) 
-0.204 
(-1.601) 
-6.146 
(-0.963) 
-7.307*** 
(-4.355) 
-0.675 
(-1.609) 
-6.632 
(-1.484) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.173* 
(1.959) 
2.552** 
(2.338) 
0.018 
(0.129) 
-18.178*** 
(-4.845) 
-14.654*** 
(-4.355) 
-1.163*** 
(-4.807) 
-13.491*** 
(-4.235) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.015 
(-0.156) 
1.742 
(0.706) 
-0.097 
(-0.800) 
-0.076 
(-0.014) 
1.480 
(0.328) 
0.557 
(-1.298) 
0.923 
(0.222) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.192) 
0.483 
(0.720) 
-0.058 
(-1.396) 
-3.272** 
(-2.038) 
-3.743** 
(-2.431) 
0.044 
(0.419) 
-3.787 
(-2.585) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.007 
(-0.465) 
-0.474 
(-0.963) 
-0.008 
(-0.679) 
0.302 
(1.418) 
0.154 
(0.847) 
0.094*** 
(3.456) 
0.060 
(0.362) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.001*** 
(2.692) 
0.002 
(0.661) 
-0.003** 
(-2.449) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.029) 
-0.036*** 
(-4.365) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.923) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.359) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.051** 
(2.372) 
-0.308** 
(-2.076) 
-0.001 
(-0.089) 
1.234** 
(2.644) 
1.400*** 
(2.741) 
0.039* 
(1.721) 
1.361 
(2.726) 
R2(%) 25.12 10.98 4.54 9.62 12.21 17.98 12.43 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable X for bank i 
over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA 
= annual growth rate of total assets; OEQUITY = EQUITY orthogonalized with TA;  D_COM/TRADQ75= dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 when COM/TRAD for bank i is greater than the third quartile of the overall 
sample and 0 oterhwise; D_COM/TRADQ25= dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when COM/TRAD  for 
bank i is lower  than the first quartile of the overall sample and 0 oterhwise;  SDROE = standard deviation of the 
return on average equity; CVROA  LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; ADZ = Z-score;  ADZP = 
“ZP-score”; ADZP1 = measure of bank portfolio risk; ADZP2 = measure of leverage risk. 
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Table 10. OLS estimations for the sample of 156 listed banks with dummies variables on 
the structure of income as the independent variables (cross section estimations) 
 Risk measures Insolvency measures 
 SDRET BETA RSPEC MDZ DD 
Sample 2 : 156 listed banks 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.008** 
(2.047) 
0.091 
(0.832) 
0.006** 
(2.020) 
-9.649 
(-1.594) 
-6.468** 
(-2.257) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.003 
(-1.289) 
-0.118** 
(-2.131) 
-0.002 
(-1.009) 
-2.987 
(-0.510) 
4.119 
(0.760) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.004 
(1.341) 
0.164* 
(1.803) 
0.003 
(1.212) 
-9.596 
(-1.478) 
4.062 
(0.881) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.004 
(1.262) 
0.080 
(1.059) 
0.004 
(1.447) 
-10.610** 
(-1.969) 
-1.563 
(-0.270) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0001*** 
(3.285) 
0.0007*** 
(5.223) 
0.0005* 
(1.841) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.449) 
-0.0003*** 
(-5.332) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0005 
(-0.179) 
0.005 
(0.463) 
-0.0001 
(-0.488) 
-0.945* 
(-1.799) 
-0.682** 
(-2.261) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0006*** 
(3.839) 
0.012*** 
(3.732) 
0.0002*** 
(2.976) 
-0.935*** 
(-3.905) 
-0.609*** 
(-2.932) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0007 
(-0.103) 
-0.005 
(-1.135) 
0.0003 
(0.242) 
0.110 
(0.306) 
2.255*** 
(3.362) 
R2(%) 34.13 45.55 21.34 24.35 29.49 
Sample 2’ : 52 small listed banks (total assets smaller than 1 billion €) 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.008** 
(2.199) 
-0.038 
(-0.991) 
0.008** 
(2.306) 
-28.868** 
(-2.258) 
-34 .487* 
(-1.647) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.002 
(0.956) 
0.019 
(0.783) 
0.002 
(0.952) 
-5.391 
(-0.685) 
-0.401 
(-0.040) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.954) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.865) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.962) 
23.353** 
(2.383) 
28.292** 
(2.167) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.003 
(1.250) 
0.019 
(0.557) 
0.003 
(1.274) 
-14.225* 
(-1.736) 
4.514 
(0.220) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0006 
(-0.098) 
0.0001** 
(2.074) 
-0.0008 
(-0.201) 
0.019 
(0.886) 
0.020 
(0.569) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
0.0007 
(0.128) 
0.003 
(0.708) 
0.0002 
(0.167) 
-1.011 
(-0.615) 
-2.837 
(-1.297) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0009 
(1.049) 
0.001 
(0.553) 
0.0003 
(1.044) 
-0.988 
(-1.211) 
-1.958** 
(-1.996) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.0003 
(1.356) 
0.004* 
(1.859) 
0.0002 
(1.266) 
0.021 
(0.032) 
2.848** 
(2.365) 
R2(%) 40.78 39.32 40.56 37.10 31.99 
Sample 2’’ : 104 large listed banks (total assets larger than 1 billion €) 
D_COMQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.005 
(1.343) 
0.027 
(0.255) 
0.004 
(1.282) 
-5.390 
(-0.855) 
-1.221 
(-0.604) 
D_COMQ25 
(t-statistics) 
0.001 
(0.354) 
-0.038 
(-0.479) 
0.001 
(0.538) 
-12.080* 
(-1.787) 
-3.321 
(-1.570) 
D_TRADQ75 
(t-statistics) 
0.007* 
(1.884) 
0.222** 
(1.990) 
0.005* 
(1.869) 
-15.184** 
(-2.205) 
-4.488** 
(-2.293) 
D_TRADQ25 
(t-statistics) 
-0.001 
(-0.146) 
-0.025 
(-0.235) 
0.001 
(0.272) 
-3.205 
(-0.480) 
0.293 
(0.133) 
M_Log(TA) 
(t-statistics) 
0.0002 
(1.283) 
0.0001*** 
(2.669) 
-0.0005 
(-0.001) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.051) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.299) 
M_ROE 
(t-statistics) 
-0.0001 
(-0.417) 
0.004 
(0.344) 
-0.0003 
(-0.791) 
-0.890 
(-1.576) 
-0.264* 
(-1.877) 
M_∆TA 
(t-statistics) 
0.0003*** 
(2.879) 
0.012*** 
(3.114) 
0.0004* 
(1.893) 
-0.823*** 
(-3.168) 
-0.212*** 
(-2.837) 
M_OEQUITY 
(t-statistics) 
0.001 
(0.927) 
0.022 
(0.738) 
0.001 
(0.928) 
-0.313 
(-0.239) 
0.381 
(1.069) 
R2(%) 30.24 40.45 18.52 25.43 28.76 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:M_X = mean of the variable X for  
bank i over the period 1996-2002; Log(TA) =  logarithm of total assets for bank i over the period 1996-
2002; ROE = return on average equity; ∆TA = annual growth rate of total assets; OEQUITY = EQUITY 
orthogonalized with TA; ;  D_COM/TRADQ75= dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when 
COM/TRAD for bank i is greater than the third quartile of the overall sample and 0 oterhwise; 
D_COM/TRADQ25= dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when COM/TRAD  for bank i is lower  
than the first quartile of the overall sample and 0 oterhwise;  ; SDRET = standard deviation of daily stock 
returns; BETA = market model beta; RSPEC = standard deviation of the market model residual;  MDZ  = 
market data based Z-score; DD = distance to default. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1. Distribution of banks by country 
 Non listed and listed banks 
    Listed banks  All banks Large banks Small banks 
Austria 29 9 20 4 
Belgium 21 11 10 1 
Denmark 43 7 36 33 
France 160 108 52 23 
Germany 16 16 0 16 
Greece 9 9 0 9 
Italy 152 69 83 26 
Netherlands 28 20 8 1 
Norway 15 10 5 15 
Portugal 17 12 5 3 
Spain 59 27 32 12 
Sweden 6 6 0 3 
Switzerland 109 15 94 6 
United Kingdom 70 47 23 4 
Total 734 366 368 156 
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for large and small European commercial and cooperative banks, on average over the period 1996-2002 (%) 
  LOANS  DEP  EQUITY LLP EXPENSES ROA ROE NII NNII 
 
COM 
 
TRAD 
 
TA 
Large banks TA>1 billion 
Sample 1: Non listed and listed banks (366 banks) 
Mean 54.50 50.48 6.74 0.79 1.42 0.56 8.38 65.57 32.18 20.91 9.025 23 117 349 
Std 18.59 19.19 4.51 0.84 0.76 0.71 10.87 20.87 20.57 16.15 12.76 62 346 854 
Max 95.49 83.67 51.42 6.77 3.82 3.92 38.01 100 93.91 86.22 92.79 7.45 E+08 
Min 10.53 2.41 0.49 -0.89 0.03 -7.10 -114.52 -105.12 -108.58 -98.29 -52.07 1 019 069 
Sample 2 : Listed banks (104 banks) 
Mean 61.57 71.19 7.14 0.77 1.49 0.662 9.628 69.59 38.64 29.24 5.51 66 504 527 
Std 17.88 11.63 3.01 0.49 0.51 0.964 9.27 11.31 14.67 11.75 6.09 146 796 957 
Max 92.12 88.19 17.51 2.52 2.72 3.67 75.77 97.09 84.24 82.02 25.94 7.45 E+08 
Min 7.81 43.91 2.23 -0.07 0.26 -6.58 -34.89 25.61 -89.55 -2.81 -9.33 1 065 437 
 
Small banks TA<1 billion 
Sample 1: Non listed and listed banks (368 banks) 
Mean 52.71 54.66 14.42 1.09 2.34 1.41 7.59 63.04 36.38 25.26 10.29 378 399 
Std 21.11 20.56 10.11 1.41 2.41 4.72 16.60 26.18 26.63 23.32 11.83 263 055 
Max 96.47 90.02 59.70 9.99 24.72 30.01 77.25 100 100 89.66 97.67 999 783 
Min 6.91 0.61 0.49 -1.67 0 -8.33 -79.49 0 -38.03 -55.63 -24.58 6 084 
Sample 2 : Listed banks (52 banks) 
Mean 58.90 72.74 16.90 1.31 2.88 1.28 8.91 73.06 34.50 22.57 4.56 352 958 
Std 24.64 19.38 14.48 1.34 3.61 3.56 7.42 14.59 26.48 19.14 13.67 273 529 
Max 90.42 90.96 55.00 8.00 46.59 23.53 23.47 87.91 97.22 100 55.55 993 219 
Min 11.16 12.92 4.35 -0.54 0.82 -17.54 -29.08 2.78 -0.09 -5.67 -12.16 25 608 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage): LOANS = loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = 
equity/total assets; LLP = loan loss provisions/net loans; EXPENSES = personnel expenses/total assets; ROA = return on average assets; 
ROE = return on average equity; NII = net interest income/net operating income; COM = net commission income/net operating income; 
TRAD = net trading  income/net operating income; NNII = net non interest income/ net operating income; MARGIN = net interest 
income/total earning assets; Interest revenue = Interest revenue/total earning assets; Lending rate  = Interest on loans/net loans; TA = 
total assets (thousand euros). 
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Table A.3. Rank correlation test: product diversification and level of risk and insolvency 
measures for European banks (1996-2002)  
 Risk Measures Insolvency measures 
 SDROA SDROE LLP ADZ ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 
NNII        
% Rank Cor. 29.28 28.43 2.87 655.9 -27.28 -15.59 -27.95 
Spearman 
Stat. 9 8.74 0.86 -201 -8.39 -4.80 -8.60 
Significance 
level (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 39.08 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
        
COM        
% Rank Cor. 22.25 18.57 1.80 -804 -16.38 -7.85 -17.01 
Spearman 
Stat. 6.81 5.69 0.54 -247 -5.01 -2.40 -5.21 
Significance 
level (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 59.05 0.000*** 0.00*** 1.63** 0.00*** 
        
TRAD        
% Rank Cor. 17.69 18.97 6.82 -551 -17.78 -13.07 -17.73 
Spearman 
Stat. 4.71 5.05 1.77 -168.7 -4.73 -3.48 -4.72 
Significance 
level (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 7.72* 0.000*** 0.00*** 0.05*** 0.00*** 
T statistics test for the null:"Risk/Insolvency is not higher for high level of product 
diversification". 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a 
unilateral test.  
Variable definitions: NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; COM 
= ratio of net commission income to net operating income; TRAD = ratio of net trading 
income to net operating income; SDROA = standard deviation of the return on average 
assets;  SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity; CVROA = coefficient 
of variation of the return on average assets; CVROE = coefficient of variation of the return 
on average equity; LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; ADZ = Z-score;  ADZP 
= “ZP-score”; ADZP1 = measure of bank portfolio risk; ADZP2 = measure of leverage 
risk. 
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Table A.4. Rank correlation test: product diversification and level of risk and 
insolvency market measures for European listed banks (1996-2002)  
 Risk Measures Insolvency risk measures 
 SDRET BETA RSPEC MDZ DD 
NNII 
     
% Rank Cor. 37.84 33.68 33.16 -33.53 -29.47 
Spearman Stat. 4.71 4.19 4.13 -4.17 -3.63 
Significance 
level (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 
      
COM     
 
 
% Rank Cor. 31.02 25.82 30.06 -27.92 -26.90 
Spearman Stat. 3.85 3.20 3.73 -3.47 -3.31 
Significance 
level (%) 0.01*** 0.14*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 
      
TRAD       
% Rank Cor. 17.05 29.27 9.09 -15.42 -26.15 
Spearman Stat. 1.98 3.40 1.06 -1.79 -3.02 
Significance 
level (%) 4.76** 0.07*** 29.09 7.32* 0.26*** 
T statistics test for the null:"Risk/Insolvency is not higher for high level of product diversification". 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a unilateral test. 
Variable definitions: NNII = ratio of net non interest income to net operating income; COM = ratio of 
net commission income to net operating income; TRAD = ratio of net trading income to net operating 
income; SDRET = standard deviation of daily returns; BETA = market model beta; RSPEC = 
standard deviation of the market model residual;  MDZ  = market data based Z-score; DD = distance 
to default.  
 
 
